COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

ernment at command for the execution of its decrees and mandates; but in point of fact there was no hostility shown to it at
any time. By all loyal persons of intelligence, and by many.
whose loyalty was very questionable, its advent was welcomed
with cordiality, and its course of administration was almost universally approved.

THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. RULE OF EXCLUSION FOR INTEREST.
The passage of an act by Congress, at its last session, repealing the rule of evidence excluding witnesses from testifying, in'1
civil actions, when " parties to or interested in the issue tried,"
makes it opportune to examine the grounds upon which that rule
has been placed by writers on the law of evidence. We have
long been persuaded, that the rule in question is alike illogical
and inexpedient. The repeal of it as a rule of practice in the
federal courts, generally not the earliest to become the theatre
of what may be styled novelties in the law, is an unexpected
stroke of good fortune, if the rule is a bad one, but an exhibition
of hasty legislation, if a good one. Coming in as an amendment
to an appropriation bill, the suspicion that so sweeping a change
in the law may have been the effect of partisan scheming, is calculated to throw doubt on its permanence, and, perhaps, to some
extent, on its propriety.
We hope, however, the law will be fairly tried, and that instead
of repealing it, when the purpose of enacting it has been subserved, it will be enlarged and amended.
1 The act is entitled "An act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses

of the Government for the year ending 30th June, 1865, and for other purposes."
The 8d section is as follows:
"And be it further enacted, That the sum of four hundred thousand dollars
is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, for the purpose of meeting any expenses in detecting and bringing to
trial and punishment, persons engaged in counterfeiting Treasury Notes, Bonds,
or other securities of the United States, as well as the coin of the United States;
Provided, That, in the courts of. the United States, there shall be no exclusion
of any witness on account of color, nor in civil actions because he is a party to

or interested in the issue tried."
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The tendency of the times is manifestly to abolish, so far as
it can be done safely, rules of exclusion, and to allow all parties,
having litigation in our courts, to state the facts as they appear
to them, leaving the" effect of those statements, as evidence, to
be determined by the jury or the court.
What is the ground upon which the rule has been placed by
our best writers on the law of evidence ?
It is, that, as a general statement,, founded on the common
experience of mankind, a witness testifying in a cause wherein
he is "a party to or interested in the issue to be tried," may
fairly be presumed rather to lie than to tell the truth; in other
words, that, taking all the cases together, the probability that
such testimony will be false or colored, is so great, that the interests of justice require it to be stated as a legal presumption, not
liable to be disputed by evidence to the contrary. From this it
is inferred, logically enough, that inasmuch as general rules must
be established, in order to make the attainment of justice practicable, it is expedient that such testimony should be wholly
excluded.
Chief Baron Gilbert says :-" When a man, who is interdsted
in the matter in question, comes to prove it, it is rather a ground
for distrust, than any just cause of belief; for men are generally
so short-sighted as to look at their own private benefit, which is
near to them, rather than to the good of the world, which is
more remote; therefore, from the nature of human passions and
actions, there is more reason to distrust such biassed testimony
than to believe it." Gilb. Ev. 722, 3d Edition.
So, Mr. Starkie says :-,This rule of exclusion, considered in
its principle, * * is founded on the known infirmities of human
nature, which'is too weak to be generally restrained by religious
or moral obligations, when tempted and solicited in a contrary
direction by temporal interests. There are, no doubt, many
whom no interested motive could seduce from a sense of duty,
and by their exclusion this rule may, in partibular cases, operate
to shut out the truth. But the law must prescribe general rules;
and experience renders it probable that more mischief would
result from the general reception of interested witnesses than is
occasioned by their general exclusion." Evid. Vol. I., p. 18, 6th
Edition.
Mr. Greenleaf, still more explicitly; says :-cc If the purposes
of justice require that the decision of causes should not be
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embarrassed by statements generally found to be deceptive, or
totally false, there must be some rule designating the class of
evidence to be excluded; and, in this case, as in determining the
ages of discretion and of majority, and in deciding as to the
liability of the wife for crimes, committed in comp'any with the
husband, and in numerous other instances, the common law has
merely followed the common experience of mankind. It rejects
the testimony (1.) of parties; (2.) of persons deficient in understanding; (3.) of persons insensible to the obligations of an oath;
and (4.) of persons whose pecuniary interest is directly in issue ;
not because they may, not sometimes state the truth, but because
it would ordinarily be unsafe to rely on their testimony." jEvid.
Yol. I., § 327.
Now, in the first place, in reference to the presumption lying
at the basis of the rule, as enunciated, we insist, that it assumes
the general untrustworthiness of testimony at the present day, in
large classes of cases, without sufficient proof; that it is liable
in other words, to the objection, that it begs the question. For,
so far from admitting this assumption to be well founded, we
deny it, and appeal confidently to the experience of mankind,
whether men and women, in general, even under circumstances
which appeal to their interest, are not disposed to be truthful
rather than untruthful; and whether even their prejudiced and
colored affirmations are not generally partial truths, and not
falsehoods, needing only that the sources from which they are
derived should be multiplied, whilst their number is increased, to
lead unerringly to the whole truth.? Nay, such is the ingenuity
required to construct a lie with circumstances, so as not to betray
the maker under an adroit cross-examination, that we appeal to
the same experience whether, as a general rule, from mingled lies
and truths, or from lies alone, when cgming from diverse sources
gnd skilfully confronted with each other, the exact truth is not
quite certain to be the outcome.
2. The rule of evidence to which we are objecting, was established many hundred years ago, but it does not follow that it
is therefore wise or expedient now, if it ever was. The march
of civilization, and much more of Christianity, has at once softened the manners and elevated the morals of the nations of
Christendom. There can be no doubt, that the average man of
to-day is far more truthful than that of the sixteenth century,
and he, than that of the fourteenth, and so on. It is the uniform
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testimony of all who mingle with savage races, and especially
with savage contaminated by contact with more civilized races,
that their oath is no better than their word, which is good for
nothing. And in this respect, the savage of our time is, doubtless, the counterpart of the savage of the middle ages in England or on the Continent, or of that of Rome or Greece fifteen
or eighteen centuries ago. But, what is important for our purpose to note, is, that at every step from those remote periods to
our day, the number of those who can be so characterized ha§
been growing Iess and less; and the rules of evidence, thought
necessary with safety and certainty to extract the truth from a
mingled mass of truth and falsehood, have been forced to accompany our race in its progress, haud passibus cequ4s, it is true,
but still within such a distance as not wholly to offend its average
sense of justice.
Thus, in the Roman law, the rule of exclusion was nuch more
strict than under that of England; it forbade father and son,
patron and client, guardian and ward, from giving evidence for
each other; a servant or other dependent was also incompetent
to give evidence for his master (Pand. lib. 22, tit. 5, s. 140) ;
parties who, by the English and American law, are constantly
admitted as witnesses for and against each other. The Louisiana
Code, derived from the Civil law of Rome, embodies some of the
same restrictions. It prevents not only husband and wife, as iii
the English law, but iscendants and descendants from testifying
for or.against each other. But, partaking of the same tendencjr
to amelioration, it has stopped in the race of restriction fat short
of its European original. In America, as compared with the
mother country, the same tendency is observable, thoiigh, unhappily, not so much so in the rules of evidence as in those relating
to real property and to personal rights. Few things are more
difficult than to carry through changes in a code of laws or in
legal practice. The consequence is, that they retain forms impressed upon them by accident or by the public will, long after
the reason for them hds ceased to be apparent, commonly because
it ita lex scripta est.'"
But whether the tendency to mitigation we have mentioned
be actual or not, and if so, whether the occasion of it is to be
i6ught in -a higher and higher morality, blossoming out as time
advances, or in a'growing conviction, from age to age, that rules
of exclusion are a mistake 4ltbgether, we regard it -as beyond
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question, that, for our time, they are violations at once of expediency and of the principles of sound reasoning.
Before proceeding to justify this assertion, let us see what is
involved in the idea of a general rule.
A general rule, like the one in question, covering several distinct classes of cases, A., B., C., and D., must hold true, in the
main, of each of those classes considered separately. If that
were not so, the class of which it would not be true, say A.,
ought not to have been embraced within it ; it should have been
excepted from the operation of the principle embraced in the
rule.
So, if we take any one of the classes comprised within the
rule, as B., and subdivide it into other classes, no matter how
minute, of which a definite description can be previously given,
as a, b, c, and d, the rule must, in like manner, apply generally
to each of those subdivisions, and for the same reason. Human
wisdom is too weak to select, by prior designation, out of a mass
of cases governed in the main by the same principles, a portion
of them, and deny the application to it of those principles. If
there be in fact exceptions from the operation of the principles
affirmed in the rule, they will make their appearance as individual
cases, and will appeal to the discretion of courts and juries, by
whom alone the circumstances making them exceptions can be
estimated.
Consider, now, in the light of this explanation, the two great
classes of cases covered by the late law of Congress, " parties
to, and parties interested in, the issue to be tried." Of these
the rule asserts, that it is more probable that they and, as a
general thing, all the sub-classes of which they are composed,
will lie or falsify, than tell the truth.
The best works on evidence, however, do in fact establish in relation to them certain exceptions from the operation of the rule as
generally stated, namely, of cases in which, although the rule is
still supposed to hold in regard to them, " parties to or interested
in the issue to be tried," are nevertheless allowed to testify on
other and independent grounds, such as public policy, the necessities of justice, &c.
Some of these cases we will now consider.
1. In many of the States, parties are admitted to prove, by
their own oath, their books of original entries, to maintain actions
of book account or of assumpsit: Eastman vs. Moulton, 3 N. H.
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156; Weed vs. Bihop, 7 Conn. 128; -Freddvs. Eves, 4 Harrington 385; Webb vs. Pindergrass,Ibid. 439; Bobbins vs. Herritt, 31 Maine 451; Poultney et al. vs. Boss, 1 Dallas 238.
Here, the exception is based, not on any alleged greater truth-.
fulness of business men who keep their own accounts, but on
the ground that, if the exception were not allowed, there would
be a failure of justice, because of the impossibility of otherwise
making the requisite proof. There is -no doubt but that such a
failure would occur, and we have no quarrel with the tribunals
which admit such testimony. But the true question is, what does
the admission of such testimony imply in relation to its truthfulness or untruthfulness? If the presumption were not indulged
that, in general, merchants, farmers, or professional men swearing to their own books would testify truthfully, or so that out
of their statements the truth could be sifted by the court or jury,
the rule establishing the exception would be absurd and iniquitous. We know that such is the presumption; that the testimony
of such witnesses is commonly regarded as trustworthy; or, if it
be at all suspicious, that the exercise of ordinary adroitness will
determine its weak points and require the case there to be
strengthened.
2. The party's own oath is admitted also, when it has already
been proved that he, against whom it is offered, has been guilty
of some fraud, or other tortious and unwarrantable act of intermeddling with the complainant's goods, and no other evidence
can be had of the amount of damages. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 348;
Herman vs. .Drinkwater, 1 Greenl. R. 27; County vs. Leidy, 10
Barr 45; Sparr vs. Wellman, 11 Mo. 230; Snow vs. Bastern
B. R. Co., 12 Metc. 44.
Thus, to give the cases commonly cited, where a man ran away
with a casket of jewels, he was ordered to answer in equity, and
the injured party's oath was allowed as evidence, in odium spoliatoris: 1 Greenl. Ev. § 348.
So, at .law, where a shipmaster
received on board his vessel a trunk of goods, to be cairied to
another port, but on the passage he broke open the trunk and
rifled it of its contents ; in an action by the owner of the goods
against the shipmaster, the plaintiff proving aliunde the delivery
of the trunk and its violation, was held competent as a witness,
on the ground of necessity, to testify to the particular contents
of the trunk: Id. § 348.
Now, why is the oath of the party here allowed, and why is it
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required that it should have been preceded by other evidence
touching the corpus delicti? Two theories may be formed to
answer these questions. First, it may be urged, that the prior
testimony of another witness is required to establish the guilt of
the defendant, such testimony being regarded as true; and that
then that of the party is received, not as being true at all, but
as probably false, in order to mete out punishment, on the priciple of - an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," to one
whom the law no longer regards as deserlying of either justice or
merdy; oi secondly, it may be maintained, that the testimony
of both sorts is admitted, because it is believed, in general, to be
truthful; as alike embodying, if not the whole truth, fragments
of it, from which the whole may, by tact and skill, be recon,
structed.
In our opinion, it needs but to state the alternatives, to see
-which is to be adopted. The theory that the law entertains such
-odium against spoilers of other men's goods, that, the fact of
guilt once established, they are abandoned as a prey to their victims, from whom, by the theory, not truth, but perjury, is in
general to be expected, is not for a moment to be entertained.
The Jewish maxim of retribution would in such a case be conYerted into " both eyes for an eye, and the whole set of teeth for
a tooth," &c., as the interest or vengeance of the suitor might
iletermine.
The public necessity, then, which admits such testimony, is z
'necessity, that the sources from which truth may be inferred
should be multiplied, in order that justice may be done, not that
there may be inflicted upon the wrongdoer to gratify the passions of his victim, injustice and outrage. The odium of which
the law speaks, ceases when the limit is reached where actual
damage ends and vengeance begins.
3. Another exception to the rule, standing on similar grounds,
is, where a witness for the prosecution is admitted to testify,
though he will be entitled, upon conviction of the offender, to a
reward from the government, to a restoration of the property
claimed as stolen, or to a portion of the fine or penalty inflicted.
1 Greenl. Ev. § 342. Here, again, the general rule is suspended,
often in actions where the personal liberty of the offender is at
stake, and where the witness is manifestly under the strongest
bias against him from interest, if not from pastion.

Does the

law assume that the testimony thus admitted will, as a general
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rule, be false, or that it will be true? The ground on which its
admission is put in the books is, that of public policy. " The
public," says Greenleaf, "chas an interest in the suppression of
crime and the conviction of criminals;" and he adds, "The distinction between these excepted cases and those which fall under
the general rule, is, that, in the latter, the benefit, resulting to
the witness is created chiefly for his own sake and not for public
purposes." Ibid. All this is true; but the real question is, what
is supposed to be the quality of the testimony of such a witness?
A man accused of crime is presumed to be innocent until proved
to be guilty. If the object of buying testimony by rewards be
to ascertain who the guilty really are, and not to find a pretext
for punishing the innocent, that testimony must be presumed, as
a general thing, to be true. And what matters it for whose sake,
or for what purpose, the benefit, on which the witness has his eye,
was created ? The true inquiry is, is the benefit a real one, and
will it, for that reason, debase the quality of the testimony rendered under its influence ?
4. A common exception, also founded on' the necessities of
public justice, is that of agents, carriers, br~kers, or servants,
when called to prove acts done for their principals in the course
of their employment. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 416.
The reason given for admitting such persons to testify, though
within the terms of the rule, and under a strong bias to protect
their employers or to shield themselves from the consequences of
their own acts, is, that " otherwise affairs of daily and ordinary
occurrence could not be proved, and the freedom of trade and
commercial intercourse would be inconveniently restrained."
Ibid.
But does not this imply, that if they are admitted, there will
be no failure of proof; that is, that their testimony will in the
main be true?
5. A fifth exception, made by most authors, is that of a witness whose interest had arisen by his own act, and without the
interference of the party calling him, after the fact, to which he
is called to testify, happened: Jack8on vs. Rumsey, 3 Johns.
Cas. 237; .Rhem vs. Jackson, 2 Dev. 187; .fafner vs. Irwin,
4 Ired. 529; Baylor vs. Smithers, 1 Litt. 105; Long vs. Baillie, 4 S. & R. 222; MeDaniel'8 Will, 2 J. J. Marsh. 831 ; Price
vs. Wood, 7 Mon. 223; Clark vs. Brown, 1 Barb. 215.
VOL. XIIL-6
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The principle of this exception is, that the interests of justice
will not allow, that a party should be deprived of testimony by
ex po8t facto fraud or collusion. But, well considered, the presumption indulged by those who admit such a witness, is, that, if
compelled to take the stand, he will so testify, that the party
will not be deprived of evidence, which will make for his interest; or, in other words, that although it is apparent, from the
statement of the case, that the witness is under a double bias,
first, from unfriendliness to the party calling him, and second,
from pecuniary interest, created for the purpose of rendering
himself incompetent to testify in his favor, nevertheless, when
wrung into the case, under oath, he will speak the truth.
Now, it will be observed, the above exceptions are based upon
independent grounds, regarded as not conflicting with that which
is laid down as the basis of the rule. That is to say, the rule is
supposed, in its generality, not to be at all affected by those
exceptions, but to be left in full force, covering completely those
as well as all other cases, the exceptions being made, as we have
seen, on the ground, not of the superior truthfulness of the witnesses specified in them, but that public necessity requires the
suspension of the general rule in those cases. If our reasoning,
however, has been correct, what is the result of admitting, that
men will commonly tell the truth in the excepted cases? Why,
that the general rule, considered as a logical formula, is absurd
from beginning to end. For, can it be that men, in cases where
falsehood cannot be discovered, as in those comprised within the
above exceptions, will be more likely, in the long run, to speak
the truth, than in those in which a departure from it would be
exposed to certain and speedy detection ?
This reasoning is 'strengthened by adverting to certain other
exceptions clearly and upon the same grounds established by our
law.
. Thus, in criminal causes, individuals who, in their own persons or in those of their friends, have been the victims of violehce, or of wrongs worse than violence, are daily allowed, without
objection, to appear as witnesses against their wrongdoers.
Technically, such witnesses are not parties to, or interested in,
the issue to be tried, and so are not within-the letter of the rule
of exclusion. But the distinction is known by everybody to be
wholly without reason. If men will ever be guilty of prevarication, of falsehood, or of perjury, they will be most likely to be
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so when testifying in cases where their feelings are most enlisted,
that is, in criminal trials. And, as a matter of fact, we know
there are no persons admitted to testify in our courts, in whom
is apparent a fiercer or more unequal struggle between native
honesty on the one hand and passion on the other, between an
instinct which bids them speak the truth and a desire in the particular case to lie, than in these. But the law says, "cadmit
these witnesses; it is probable their testimony will be prejudiced,
and in many cases false, but the tact and experience of judges
and counsel will sift the false from the true." Does a slight difference in the record, unsuspected by the witness, known only to
the court and counsel, change the intrinsic character for truth
and veracity of the one, or affect the degree of skill with which
his testimony will be scrutinized by the others ?
The law has also said, that in Chancery cases, although the
same rule of exclusion shall ordinarily prevail, basedupon a similar presumption of general untruthfulness, defendants may be
made witnesses by their opponents, on the condition, that the
latter shall be bound by their answers, true or false, if responsive to the bill. But, is it right for a court thus to allow complainants, relying on their belief that they will win, to take their
chances in a lottery, where to its superior wisdom it is certain,
as .a general rule, that they will lose; when it knows that the
testimony which their common sense tells them will probably'be
true, will, on the contrary, be false or deceptive?
If it is objected to this view, that the cases in which defendants would be called on to answer under oath would be those,
commonly, in which their character for veracity would-be so well
known, that complainants would be unlikely to be mistaken about
it, or, if they were, that they would have only themselves to
blame; the answer is: that if that be admitted, the difficulty
still remains. Complainants may be mistaken; we all know that
they frequently are; they would themselves readily admit that
they are quite likely to be; and the court asserts, implicitly, by
the rule in question, that they will be so mistaken in a majority
of cases. , What shall be said of a tribunal, which, admitting this
presumption, nevertheless holds itself ready to receive as evidence the colored or lying statements of such witnesses, if the
parties consent to it? Can it be a court of justice when it
announces beforehand that, if asked to do so, it will render
decrees upon testimony which it knows will be generally false?
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The fact is, neither courts nor juries believe any such thing.
They believ6, as do all men, not writers of books of evidence,
that witnesses, in general, are truthful; that any number of
them sufficient to constitute a class, with like features or in similar circumstances, will be so likewise, or that when they fail, they
will furnish data for the correction of their own half-truths or
untruths.
Thus, the exceptions we have been considering, if based on
necessity, the general rule still being supposed to cover them,
upset the rule itself. And they would still more clearly do this,
if made on the ground that the rule does not in principle cover
them. For admit, as we have said, the general truthfulness of
interested testimony, given when detection of falsehood, from
the circumstances of the excepted cases, would be well-nigh
impossible, and it is absurd to deny it in any other class of cases
whatever. *
But the advocates of the rule of exclusion may shift their
ground, and insist that the real scope and design of the rule are
to require the best evidence; that where the testimony of witnesses, therefore, fiot 14parties to or interested in the issue to be
tried," can be had, it should be produced, and the less trustworthy
be excluded. Suppose it be admitted, contrary as we believe to
the fact, that such are the intent and scope of the rule. Why
not then put it on that ground ? Why not limit its operation to
cases in which better evidence can be found than that coming
from the parties themselves ? Such a rule, though not the best
one, in our opinion, would obviate one of the greatest practical
objections to the rule, as it is, namely, that there are numberless
cases, familiar to every lawyer, which are absolutely beyond the
reach of any remedy for want of evidence lying only in the
breast of the parties. Abrogate this senseless- rule and allow
parties to testify, and only consummate wickedness linked with
preternatural cunning would be able to baffle the efforts of courts
and counsel to arrive at the truth.
As we haive said, under the operation of the existing rule,
there is no remedy at all in divers cases, because the courts will
not hear -the only witnesses who know the facts. How many
such cases there are, it is not easy to say, but reckoning those
in which justice either limps or wholly fails for that reason, they
are perhaps one-tenth as numerous as all the cases in our courts.
It is true, the law has provided a device by which the-truth, iu
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such cases, may sometimes be attained, notwithstanding the rule
of exclusion; namely, that of bills of discovery. But the provision is inadequate, and is made at the expense of the rule itself.
The remedy is ineffectual, because not commensurate with the
evil it was designed to obviate. The injured party, having
brought his suit at law, is allowed to appeal to the conscience of
the opposite party by bill in equity, and to require him to answer
such interrogatories as he may put to him, under oath. But
suppose the opposite party has no conscience. There being no
counter-oath of the complainant, the defendant's ahswer is to be
taken as true, without denial or explanation, and, if adverse, the
injured party is cast in both suits and pays all the costs. But
why allow the appeal at all, as we have before asked, if, as a
general rule, in such casey the answer would be false? And if
it would generally be true, why limit the giving of testimony to
the defendant ? If there is a presumption to be indulged, is it
not, that he who complains to our courts not only has a grievance, but is as truthful a man as he of whom he complains ?
Thus, we think it is clear, that the rule in question is illogical
-based on a premise which at this day is erroneous, namely,
that men who are interested in a suit, either as parties or pecuniarily, if called as witnesses, will, in general, testify untruthfully. To some extent also the inexpediency of the rule has, we
think, been made to appear; but a glance at the rule as it ought
to be, will make it still more evident.
We think the fact that a man is a party to the record, or
interested in the event of a suit, ought to go to his credibility
and not to his competency, reversing the maxim, that presumes
men in general to be liars, and making it run, that they are
prima facie worthy of belief, or at least of a hearing and a
candid judgment. If such a rule were established, it would be
easy to make allowance for cases where it might work injustice.
In the administration of estates of deceased persons, if it were
judged unwise to trust to the oath of the surviving party only,
an exception could be made requiring the oath of the creditor to
be fortified by other testimony. So, in such other cases as presented similar grounds of objection. Perhaps, even, it might be
thought advisable to prescribe, that the best evidence should, in
certain contingencies, be produced, along with that which is likely
to be less trustworthy: thus, if disinterested witnesses existed,
it might be required, at the instance of either party, to produce
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them, under regulations looking to the prevention of injustice
and the saving of expense, and yet not forbid, but regularly, in
the first instance, permit the introduction of the testimony of the
parties in interest. Why should the courts decline to profit by
the admissions and denials of those who are cognisant of the facts,
any more than the same individuals would, if examining into the
origin of an affray in front of their own doors? Once provide,
that, whatever be the testimony, and by whomsoever given, the
tribunal to judge of it shall hear, but be at liberty to believe or
reject it, as it may seem just, and the danger of overwhelming
it by false testimony will be very slight.
One consequence of such a reversal of the rule would be, that
a case would rarely arise which the courts could not reach for
want of testimony; another, that fewer cases would be decided
improperly, because decided upon a partial view of the facts;
another, that the rules of evidence, purporting to be based on
human experience, would be made to harmonize with it, and not
be, as now, belied by it; and thus the respect men are always
inclined to feel for their courts of justice would be heightened,
or at least be justified.
As a fitting close, we are happy to append an extract from
the report of the commissioners, appointed by the Legislature of
New York to frame the present code of that State, bearing upon
the subject we have been considering, as follows:
" The abrogation of the rule which excludes a witness who has
an interest in the event of the action, has been frequently proposed and discussed in this State. We think the time has come
for effecting it. The rule appears'to us to rest upon a principle
altogether unsound, that is, that the situation of the witness will
tempt him to lying.
"The reason strikes at the foundation of human testimony.
The only just inquiry is this: whether the chances of obtaining
the truth are greater from the admission or exclusion of the witness ? Who, that has any respect for the society in which he
lives, can doubt that, upon this principle, the witness should be
admitted? The contrary rule implies, that, in the niajority of
instances, men are so corrupted by their interest that they will
perjure themselves for it, and that be~ides being corrupt, they
will be so adroit as to deceive courts and juries. This is contrary
to all experience. In the great majority of instances the witnesses are honest, however much interested, and.in most cases of

